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The subject of my paper is a global one, posing some of the ultimate ques-
tions that can be posed about human communication, language and litera-
ture. My purpose is to fly high to map a lot of ground, and my hope is 
to pose some questions and define some concepts in ways that might be 
helpful to students of literary communication. 
For a number of years now, linguists have operated with concepts such 
as grammaticality, acceptability, and stylistic decorum or appropriateness 
(decorum being a concept that has been with us since the ancients). In 
my own personal variant of this terminology, grammaticality refers to rela-
tions between an utterance (usually a sentence) and a grammatical descrip-
tion of the language in question. A sentence is grammatical or ungrammati-
cal in relation to a certain grammatical treatise. Acceptability is a concept 
relating an utterance to the judgements of suitably Chosen informants: an 
utterance has high acceptability if it is approved of by a high proportion 
of judges. Thchniques of acceptability studies have been described e.g. in 
GREENBAUM 1987. Appropriateness is contextualized acceptability: there 
are utterances which are acceptable in some contexts but odd or rude or 
excessively solemn in others. An appropriate expression is one that cOn-
forms to expectations in a certain definite situation. Appropriate expres-
sions raise no eyebrows because of their form and style: if they surprise, 
they do so because of their contents. 
These three concepts, however useful in their own spheres, fail to cover 
the most basic question of all, namely, when is a text interpretable (or com-
prehensible)? Could we perhaps learn to specify more precisely what makes 
it possible for a hearer or reader to understand a text? What do we mean 
by (<understanding a text» anyway? Should we supplement «success con-
cepts» such as grammaticality, acceptability, and appropriateness with a 
fourth, interpretability? If so, how are we to define interpretability? 
Let me reveal my main point at once. It would be fallacious to expect 
that we could use linguistic form alone to draw the line between interpreta-
bility and non-interpretability. To cut a long story short: we all have daily 
experience of impromptu speech, where we understand our fellow men even 
when they mess up their syntax, make false starts, hesitate, pause, correct, 
and repair their utterances. There are discourses which function perfectly 
well in a speech situation but which are hard to analyse in terms of tradi-
tional syntax because they refuse to segment into proper clauses and sen-
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tences. We also have experiences of texts which wilfully flout all plausible 
rules of syntactic well-formedness but all the same do a good job in their 
particular context. I am thinking of so-called modernistic poems for in-
stance, and of the kind of advertising that attracts attention by its disregard 
of standards appropriate to, say, literate expository prose. In such contexts 
syntactic deviance can be a virtue instead of a sin. 
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As the language of literature is our concern, let me cite a few examples 
of what I have in mind. Unfortunately, the term «nonsense» has been used 
so loosely as to make it useless for my purposes. Edward LEAR is often 
called a writer of nonsense, and two of the loci classici of illustration of 
so-called «nonsense poetry» are Lewis CARROL'S «Jabberwocky» and 
perhaps even EE CUMMINGS'S «Anyone Lived In A Pretty How Towll». 
A linguist should not rest happy with such indiscriminate lumping together 
of disparate phenomena. Edward LEAR'S «nonsense» consists of evoca-
tions of funny worlds in normal English. Lewis CARROL'S <monsense» 
builds on the use of invented but graphotactically, phonotactically and 
semantically highly structured and suggestive words in normal syntactic 
frames. And EE CUMMINGS uses normal words but in warped syntax and 
an adventurous typography. 
So, instead of talking about <monsense» and of once again quoting these 
classic instances, let me give you a few other examples, this time from 
Russian and German literature. As all the texts I shall cite were presumably 
written as experiments, we might recall at the outset that experimental 
poetry can be roughly classified under three headings. There is stochastic 
poetry which is put together by statistical principles, including randomiza-
tion, nowadays often by computer. There is concrete poetry whose 
typographical shape is suggestive of referents in a real world: you can give 
a poem about drinking the shape of a bottle on the printed page. And 
finally there is what one might lump together as Dada, allowing the possi-
bility of Dada poetry long before the birth of Dadaism and the various 
Futurist and Dadaist Manifestos that began appearing around 1910 
(QVARNSTROM 1973): «Ehe Dada da war, war Dada da,» as Hans ARp once 
put it. Note that I am here using Dada as a default category just as vague 
as <monsense>>: its only function is to contrast with stochastic and concrete 
poetry. There are many kinds of Dada. 
My first example is a famous, or notorious, poem by Alexej KRUT-
JONYCH, one of three poems «written in my own language differing from 
others: their words lack definite meaning». The text runs as follows: 
8 
dyr bul scyJ 
ubesscur 
skum 
vy so bu 
r I ez 
This «transrational poem», here cited from HARDING and JANGFELDT 1976 
(Figure I), was published in a book entitled Pomada in 1913. Not surpris-
ingly, established cirtics failed to appreciate KRUTJONYCH'S outrageous 
claim that these five lines contained more of the Russian national character 
than all of PUSHKIN'S poetry put together! Granted, some of the letter and 
sound combinations may suggest existing lexemes of Russian such as dyrd 
«hole» and butka «bun», whereas others seem to lack such semantic associ-
ations; to Russian ears, the lines of KRUTJONYCH'S «poem» sound harsh 
and ugly. Nor did KRUTJONYCH avoid a conflict with basic rules of Russian 
orthography: the letter Ill,. (sts) should not occur in front of 6t (y). Also 
they fail to evoke a coherent world picture: for instance they resist sum-
marizing. In a word: KRUTJONYCH'S poem is not referentially interpretable. 
But it is all the same not meaningless: it carries nreaning as a symptom 
of its creator's state of mind, his revolt against established literary patterns, 
his scoffing at traditions. Its meaning lies in the metamessage, to speak 
with Deborah TANNEN (1986), rather than in the message proper. And in 
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its revolt we can find an anticipation of 1917: perhaps KRUTJONYCH'S claim 
was not so outrageous after all. 
The reason why I wanted to cite KRUTJONYCH is that his «poem» teaches 
us an important lesson. Man is a meaning-hunting animal. If we cannot 
find a referential meaning in a message - that is, if we cannot discover 
the symbolic and syntactic function of the words and morphemes - we 
still do not give up. We shift our quest for meanings from semantics to 
pragmatics, and try to interpret the message as a symptom of its producer's 
mental and physical state and purpose. So, when semantics fails, prag-
matics takes over. In most types of communication, message and metames-
sage work together in happy harmony, one supporting the other. In KRUT-
JONYCH'S «poem», however, the message proper is minimal or null, and 
the metamessage must carry the burden of communication. And indeed 
the metamessage struck home: KRUTJONYCH is remembered and his 
«poem» is cited, for instance at this moment at St. Gallen, seventy-five 
years after its publication. 
The Russian futurists are rightly famed for their many texts of interest 
to the student of interpretability. In Vassilij KAMENSKI'S «armoured-con-
crete poems» for instance, typography was used as a futurist device, as a 
symbol of revolt against conventions. 1Ypography is similarly important 
for his famous poem «Tango with Cows», whose referential message is clear 
enough not to daunt modern readers used to poetic experimentation. One 
Englishing of this text might run as follows: 
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Life is shorter than the sparrow's squeak. 
Isn't it a dog floating 
On the block of ice in the spring flood? 
With tin-coated joy 
We look at fate. 
We are discoverers of countries, 
Worms under the skins of fruit 
Kings of the orange groves. 
We are cattleraisers. 
Perhaps we shall some time drink 
A goblet of wine 
For the health of the finished planets 
Or better - wind the gramophone. 
But go to hell 
You hornless ones and pressing-irons! 
I want to dance alone 
The tango with cows 
And build bridges 
From the jealous tears of the bulls 
To the tears of the scarlet girl. 
(Cited from HARDING and JANGFELDT 1986; translation by N. E. E. Text in Figure 2.) 
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Though space forbids a more thorough analysis, let me just say that in 
my own reading, the poem has always made good referential sense. It begins 
with reflections on mortality; goes on the exult man ironically: man in 
cosmos is like a worm in an orange; moves from exhausted planets to 
artefacts of entertainment, gramophones; tells the oppressive «pressing-
irons» - utjugi, which at least in current Soviet slang also refers to black-
market dealers in jeans and other sought-after Western commodities - of 
a powerless establishment to go to hell; and ends with a union of man 
and nature, a tango with cows, and bridge-building between the tears of 
jealous bulls and those of a weeping girl. We move from mortality through 
ironic exultation to salvation in the individual's happy rejoicing with the 
brute creation. Here the vocabulary and syntax are normal enough for easy 
pattern recognition. What is remarkable is the coexistence of the startling 
typography, which builds up a structure of its own by contrasting with nor-
mal printing and by emphasizing certain words, and some of the colloca-
tions which evoke unusual and absurd though not absolutely counterfac-
tual images: in some reasonably literal sense, I suppose, one could actually 
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dance the tango with cows. Like the surrealists, KAMENSKIJ liked to juxta-
pose incompatibles in a startling manner. 
A few further examples, this time from German, citing the reader by 
HAJNY and WIRBELAUER (1983). In his texte lind kommentare (Anabas Ver-
lag, Steinbach 1968), Claus BREMER published a text - call it a poem if 
you like - entitled «immer schon in der reihe bleiben,» which consisted 
of these words repeated 52 times: 
immer schon in der reihe bleiben 
immer schon in der reihe bleiben 
immer schon in der reihe bleiben 
immer schon in der reihe bleiben 
immer schon in der reihe bleiben 
immer schon in def reihe bleiben 
immef schon in der reihe bleiben 
immer schon in der reihe bleiben 
immer schon in der reihe bleiben 
immer schon in der reihe bleiben 
immer schon in der reihe bleiben 
The point is, of course, that the reader refuses to stay in the ranks. «Diese 
Organisation,» said BREMER, «provoziert den Freiheitsdrang und die Ver-
nunft.» The referential meaning of «immer schon in der reihe bleibem> 
and the crushingly oppressive repetition create a tension which shows the 
absurdity of staying in the ranks and of reading the whole text line by line. 
The poem is ironical in that its metrical, iconic, concrete structure reveals 
the absurdity of its referential meaning. The interpretation hinges on the 
coexistence of two simultaneous structures, namely the referential meaning 
and its repetition, and on the ironic tension that prevails between them. 
Yet another classic example from Kurt SCHWITTERS (Das Literarische 
Werk, ed. Friedheim LACH, Dumont 1973, i: 205), namely the final move-
ment of his «Ursonate». 
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Zatt tipsiilon iks (bewegt) 
Wee fau Uu 
Tee ~ss arr kuu 
Pee 00 ann 1imm 
Ell kaa Ii haa 
Gee aff Ee dee zee bee? 
:lat iipsiilon iks (bewegter) 
Wee fau Uu 
The ass arf kuu 
Pee 00 ann amm 
Ell kaa Ii haa 
Gee aff Ee dee zee beee? 
:lat iipsiilon iks (einfach) 
Wee fau Uu 
Tee ass arr kuu 
Pee 00 ann amm 
Ell kaa Ii haa 
Gee aff Ee dee zee bee Aaaaa. 
Zatt Opsiilon iks (sehr bewegf) 
Wee fau Uu 
Tee ass arr kuu 
Pee 00 ann amm 
Ell kaa Ii haa 
Gee aff Eeee dee zee beeee? (schmerzlich) 
In my reading, this. poem could be entitled «Beloved A, Once Found And 
Again Lost For Even>. Doomed to his eternal quest for structures in mes-
sages, the reader soon notices the reversal of the alphabet, and is struck 
by the missing A .. He engages in a quest, becoming agitated (bewegt - be-
wegter!); in a calmer mood (einfach), he finds his A; he rejoices (sehr be-
wegt), and once again loses the A, painfully (schmerzlich). The number 
of vowels in the spelling-forms of letters, as in bee versus beeee, hint at 
possible readings and accentuate the shifts in mood. Here too, then, a 
reader finds a meaning-creating structure, though the individual «words» _ 
names of letters - lack referential meaning in themselves. 
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These examples, I should emphasize, were all authentic in the sense that 
they have been cited from literature rather than invented for my lecture. 
Their writers at least have expected them to function in literary communica-
tion: they are texts in a literary speech act (PRATT 1977). Lest somebody 
still doubt that any reasonable definition of syntactic or textual well-
formedness, however it be defined, is inadequate as a criterion for com-
municative function, let me cite two fabrications of my Own. The first goes 
like this: 
The goalkeeper writhed on the ground. With agonizing slowness the ball rolled over 
the white chalk line to the roar of ten thousand fans. Just before the players began 
to celebrate their triumph there was a whistle. The referee declared the kick offside. 
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Note that there are no overt cohesive links such as repetitions or pronomi-
nal anaphoras or substitutions or synonyms or ellipses tying the sentences 
to each other. All the same the text is coherent to all those who know about 
football. On the contrary we can have pseudo-coherent texts with plentiful 
links between their sentences which still fail to make sense. Here is one: 
I walked to work. Work is the workaholic's opium. DeQuinceywas a romantic. Roman-
tic settings often involve the moon. Dust from there was analysed in severallaborato-
ries. They are expensive to build. Build is an irregular verb. 
As I already noted, yet another type discourse which makes use of pauses, 
hesitations, false starts, corrections, repair, anacolutha. and other depar-
tures from the syntactic norms characteristic of, say, literate expository 
writing is, of course, impromptu speech (ENKVIST 1982). Every day we suc-
cessfully interpret hundreds if not thousands of such impromptu utterances 
in context, though these same utterances might look messy beyond inter-
pretability when given in decontextualized transcription. 
In the light of all these examples, which could be multiplied and varied 
ad infinitum, we should once again ask, what is it that makes a coherent 
text coherent? And let me repeat once again: to enumerate all those syntac-
tic and lexical structures that lead to textual coherence, and to suggest that 
structures beyond the list would fail to contribute to coherence, would obvi-
ously be a hopeless job, even if we tried to do so through generative rules 
capable of generating an infinite number of texts rather than by taxonomic 
lists covering a limited corpus. Coherence is a matter of successful process-
ing, not of linguistically specifiable structuring. 
Perhaps one of the reasons for man's spectacular evolutionary success 
is his compulsive yen to extract meaning from messages. Now meanings 
arise out of contrasts. If an item does not contrast with anything else, it 
cannot have meaning. And contrasts can arise only rithin systems allowing 
paradigmatic alternatives. When a receptor hears or sees a message, he con-
trasts the elements actually present in the message with the other elements 
in the contrastive set of paradigmatic alternatives, that is, with those ele-
ments the text-producer's choice excluded from the message. Such an exclu-
sion of alternatives is what produces information. 
That messages may have meanings at several levels follows from the fact 
that they may contain elements from several contrastive sets at several 
different levels. When interpreting messages we try to find the levels that 
carry information through the exclusion of items from a contrastive 
paradigmatic set. In KRUTJONYCH'S poem there were no readily specifiable 
referential meanings, there was no world picture evoked by the nonsense-
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syllables which were too nonsensical to belong to any recognizable lexical 
set. Therefore the interpreter had to move on to the metamessage, interpret-
ing KRUTJONYCH'S choice as a symptom of his attitudes to the world and 
to poetry rather than as an effort to refer to, or evoke, a factual or counter-
factual world. Such emphasizing of metamessages and symptomatic mean-
ings is common also for instance in phatic discourse, whose information 
contents are, under relevant circumstances, too meager to motivate the ef-
fort of expressing them. If I go up San tis with Professor WYLER and say, 
«Well well well and here we are on top of old San tis again,» the referential 
contents of my message - though true as they reflect an existing state of 
affairs in a universe of discourse - do not tell Professor WYLER anything 
he didn't know before. What my utterance tells him is that I want to recipro-
cate his friendship and have reached the end of my tolerance of silence. 
The metamessage should still strike home. 
So, discourse has potential meanings at all those levels at which a given 
receptor in a give~ situation can assign contrasts to the items actually 
present in the discourse. There are situations where even an inarticulate 
grunt contrasts with something, namely the absence of a grunt through 
either silence or articulate speech. It may, in context, produce highly 
specific information. An example: at the dentist's, a muffled grunt, as con-
trasting with silence, may suffice to signal the presence of live nerve tissue 
at a very specific point of a very specific root canal. 
The larger the number of contrast-carrying systems activated by a piece 
of discourse, the greater is its pregnancy of meaning. There are certain kinds 
of poetry which might be defined as different from, say, scientific prose 
because of their larger number of coexistent· contrast-carrying semantic 
and pragmatic systems, and their resulting greater pregnancy of meaning 
(a principle argued at length in LorMAN 1977). But there may also be texts 
usually classified as literary, such as KRUTlONYCH'S or SCHWITTERS'S 
«poems» cited above, which produce their effect precisely through their 
paucity of levels of meaning. Here we may suspect that readers use another 
of man's basic capacities, namely imagination. We have learned to expect 
something, and when we do not find it, we fill it in on our own accord. 
Just as HEMINGWAY'S texts have been called sentimental because they leave 
the filling-in of sentiment to the reader, so SCHWITTERS'S text can provoke 
thoughts of universal quest and loss, universal precisely because of the lack 
of specifics in SCHWITTERS'S alphabet-dominated text world. We might 
speak of such texts as triggers, as «generators of thought» to speak with 
LorMAN 1986, as opposed to texts as references. Indeed texts can be ranged 
on a scale between the extremely referential (scientific texts for instance, 
best expressed in artificial languages lacking the disturbing connotations 
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of natural tongues) and the extremely suggestive (like poetry), or between 
the explicit and the implicit as I said in ENKVIST 1983. 
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Now back to my question, what makes a piece of discourse interpretable? 
The best answer I can give goes like this: 
A piece of discourse is interpretable to those who can, under the prevailing circum~ 
stances, build around it a text world in which that piece of discourse makes sense, 
either by being potentially true in that particular text world, or by conforming to ac~ 
ceptable maxims of human behaviour, or both. 
There are many formidable problems compressed into these forty-nine 
words. 
First I am assuming that discourse comprehension involves world-
building, or scenario-building if you prefer that term. We understand texts 
and discourse by placing them in a scenario, in a world. Either the world 
is once and for all circumscribed by the situational context, as in face-to-
face communication about the situation itself. For instance if I am pulling 
up a heavy boat from the sea with my son and say «About six inches more 
and a bit to the left», he wiJI at once know the world into which the utter-
ance belongs. Or then the world is evoked by the utterance. Had I continued 
by saying to my son, «Last night I was planning my next trip to St. Gallem), 
he would have to evoke another world, namely that of my activities on 
the night before. 
What are the bricks and the mortar of the text world we are building? 
1b repeat: the structuralists and information theorists were right in claim-
ing that all meanings arise out of contrast. Any element that contrasts with 
another element within a system is meaningful. An,d an element which does 
not contrast with anything else lacks meaning, fails to increase information 
either because of its lack of structuring or because of its predictability, 
and does not involve the kind of choice that results in meaning. Contrasts 
of course exist in any system, a system being by definition a sequence of 
structured choices with a condition of entry. 
A natural language is a system of systems, some of these systems indeed 
merging, through paralanguage, into non-linguistic behaviour patterns. As 
I already noted, meaningful choices arise through choices in many systems: 
choices between letters, phonemes, morphemes, words, syntactic struc-
tures, and textual and discoursal structures, including metrical and literary 
ones, as well as intonation patterns, paralinguistic features, proxemics. 
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body movement, gesture and facial expression and the like. All paradig-
matic choices at all these levels are potential carriers of meaning and poten-
tial bricks in the building of the text world. Also there are paradigmatic 
choices in the frames, schemata and scripts in which we store our 
knowledge of the world. Thus if I say, «Nils Enkvist is wearing a blue tie.», 
the choice of blue has eliminated all other colours of the contrastive 
paradigm available in the schema of colours. Intertextual systems also pro-
vide meaningful choices: if somebody wants to express his feelings in a 
sonnet, the choice of form will contribute to the meaning of the message. 
The mortar that binds the bricks into structures is the syntagmatic struc-
ture of the discourse. However, as chains of units at one level form single 
units at the next higher level, our analogy between bricks and mortar unfor-
tunately breaks down: a chain of morphemes, such as un + fortunate + 
ly consisting of three bricks and word-formation mortar, turns out to be 
one single brick in the syntactic structure Unfortunately John did not 
know., which in turn can be a single brick in a text. Therefore a better 
analogy than bricks and mortar might be a prefabricated house: planks 
are put together into a module, this module becomes part of a waJl, the 
wall becomes part of a house, the house is part of a housing project, the 
housing project is part of a street, the street is part of a city. 
A text, then, is interpretable to those who manage this kind of world-
building under the relevant circumstances. The world-building process is 
constrained by the interpreter's person, his previous knowledge, present 
mood and purpose, as well as by the situational context. Referential in-
terpretation is to begin with a yes-no, or threshold, phenomenon: a text 
is to some extent interpretable to all who can build some kind of world 
around it. But once the interpretability threshold is crossed we should 
recognize degrees of interpretation. A person trained in nuclear physics 
is bound to extract more meanings than a layman out of a physical text: 
he can better reconstruct the choices made by the text producer, among 
other things because he knows more about the choices not taken. And the 
situational context of course helps information crucially, as we saw in the 
example of myself with son pulling up our heavy boat from the sea. 
The criterion of successful world-building is that the text we have been 
given fits snugly into the world we have construed around it, again in the 
opinion of the discourse interpreter. Such fits can be explicated in two ways: 
in terms of referential truth-functional semantics, and in terms of prag-
matics. The former, semantic, way would involve saying that the world and 
the discourse form a match when the discourse might be true in that parti-
cular world. «Might be» rather tan <<is)) to allow for fiction: note that the 
science-fiction-writer's problem is how to help the reader construct a text 
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world in which a counter factual text becomes plausible and thus potentially 
true. The latter, pragmatic, way involves relating the text to maxims of 
human behaviour, such as those of Grice and Leech and the relevance prin-
ciples of SPERBER and WILSON (GRICE 1975, LEECH 1983, SPERBER and 
WILSON 1986). Symptomatic meanings, metamessages, inference, irony and 
the like can presumably be reached only through pragmatics. It is not my 
purpose here to look into the philosophical questions as to the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of truth-functional and pragmatic world-
building, or to discuss to what extent truth functions perhaps reduce into 
pragmatics and vice versa. Generally speaking, the balance between these 
two ways of placing the text in a world depends on the text type. In scientific 
communication for instance, referential meanings are crucial. On the 
contrary, in trying to make sense of KRUTJONYCH'S poem we must largely 
rely on pragmatic views of the metamessage, and use our pragmatic infer-
ences to generate a world around the text. 
Tho more points about text worlds. In my jargon, «universe of dis-
course» is the universe of which one specific text world is part. For instance 
if my text world is a conference at St. Gallen the universe of discourse in-
volves conferences in general, the Handelshochschule of St. Gallen, the 
city, Switzerland, and so forth. Obviously a text cannot bring in all features 
of all worlds and universes. The building of text worlds stops at a relevance 
threshold: what remains outside the relevance threshold for one individual 
text is part of the universe of discourse. The specifics we put into the text 
world are special instances of our general knowledge of the universe of 
discourse. And we can put in such specifics, either because they are ex-
plicitly mentioned in the text or because we know them by inference. 
Inferencing in turn is largely based on a knowledge of prototypes. Our 
universe of discourse is built up of prototypes - of the prototypical bird, 
the prototypical room, the prototypical professor, and so forth - and once 
somebody mentions a bird or a room or a professor, we can extract features 
from the prototype which is available in our universe of discourse. This 
enables us to sketch out features in the text world if and when the need 
appears, until we are told to abandon prototypical features for features 
specified in the text. There is thus a default rule favouring the prototype. 
If somebody talks about a bird, without giving us any further clues as to 
what kind of bird he has in mind, we provide the emerging text world with 
a creature more like a sparrow or pigeon than an ostrich or turkey or hum-
mingbird or penguin, unless or until our interlocutor gives us clues to aban-
doning the prototype we used for default, or the situation gives us clues 
to specifics we ought to put into the emerging text world. At an Antarctic 
research station, a reference to «bird» might well be taken to refer to a 
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penguin. The specific states of affairs in OUf text world are thus partIy pro-
totypical inferences, which may be influenced by the situation and context, 
and partly features expressly specified in the text. Here by the way is one 
of the explanations why I dislike film versions of favourite novels. I have 
inferred my own concrete visualizations of prototypical features suggested 
by default, and when the film-producer's concretizations differ from my 
own I get disappointed and annoyed. (One of the classic papers on proto-
types is ROSCH 1977.) 
This use of prototypes for non-specified features in the text world can 
of course be restated in terms of information theory. Of several alternatives 
we always choose the most probable, the one that is most likely to occur 
in a given context and situation. And by definition the most likely is at 
the same time the most prototypcial in the relevant context. For instance, 
if somebody tells me there are no animals left in St. Gallen, and I say, 
«No, on my way to this lecture room I saw three.», these animals are more 
likely to have been cats or dogs or perhaps horses than, say, ostriches or 
hippopotami or whales. And probability is the inverse of information: what 
is most probable is least startling and least informative. To cite the Semantic 
Axiom Number One of Martin loos, the least meaning is the best meaning 
(loos 1972). 
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The bulding-up of a text world is an incremental process. Every structured 
element in a piece of discourse increases information and certainty by ex-
cluding alternatives. The larger the number of excluded alternatives, the 
greater the information content of the element (though we can quantify 
information content only in closed systems with a limited number of ele-
ments, preferably with readily calculable sequential probabilities of occur-
rence). In communication, our aim is to enable the receptor to build up 
a text world which is sufficiently isomorphic with our own to satisfy the 
communicative needs in this particular situation. The order in which text 
worlds are built up through incrementation is of course of great impor-
tance, both for the text world itself and for ease of processing. And choice 
of order is one of the most important ingredients in what I shall call text 
strategy. 
Let me cite a piece of text to counterbalance my overlong theorizing. 
Once again I shall choose a tourist guide because it so neatly shows what 
I have in mind. I cite from the description of the Villa Adriana in the Blue 
Guide to Rome and Central Italy: 
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Allhe N.E. angle of the Poikile are the remains of the Philosophers' Hall (57 by 
39 ft.), with an apse, seven niches for statues, and four side-doors; and adjacent is 
a series of baths. Thence we pass into a circular building (140 ft. in diameter), with 
an Ionic marble peristyle, known as the Naval Theatre or Natatorium, but more proba-
bly a retreat in which the emperor sought occasional solitude. Within, a circular moat 
(c. 12 ft. broad), lined with Luni (Carrara) marble, enclosed an island which could 
be reached only by removable gangways. 
To the S. of the Naval theatre extends an olive-planted valley called the Stadium, 
running N. and S. and flanked on the E. and W. by edifices. That on the E. comprises 
a rectangular court (193 ft. by 109 ft.), with a portico of fluted composite columns. 
(P.378.) 
Notice the high frequency of structures of the type locative adverbial + 
copula + subject, (<in such-and-such-a-place is such-and-such a sigh!». 
Obviously these structures owe to what I have called experiential iconicity 
(ENKV1ST 1980), that is, the principle of ordering the text to reflect ex-
perience or action. The strategy might be labelled go-look-learn: first the 
tourist is supposed to go to a specific place, then he is supposed to look 
at something, and then to learn about what he is looking at. The linear 
order of constituents in the sentence thus reflects the order of actions ex-
pected of the tourist who follows the guide. 
The fronted locative adverbials also have another function. They mark 
the onset of new sections of text, which correlate with stops on the tourist's 
route: each stop, each go-look-learn unit corresponds to a section of the 
guidebook. To borrow a term from Lars EVENSEN (1988), they might be 
called «Superstructural pointers» (as long as we remember that the disposi-
tion of a text into text units in fact is not a superstructure imposed on 
sentences, but the other way round a base structure which determines the 
grouping and shape of the sentences). And, in additon to clarifying the 
structure of the text in units, the locatives also explicate the hierarchization 
of the sights. We might for instance have a passage which begins with a 
fronted adverbial specifying a cathedral, followed by a passage that begins 
with a locative adverbial specifying a chapel, followed by a set of passages 
with fronted locatives specifying parts of the chapel. For brevity I fabricate 
an example: 
In the cathedral of Nirgendshof we can see some of the most celebrated sculptures 
of the 13th century. In the first chapel on the left are the tombs of the Schlachthaufen 
family. In the centre is the sarcophagus of Konrad von Schlachthaufen, on the right 
that of his son Hartmuth. In the second chapel we see ... 
This type of text is obviously dominated by an iconic strategy. The arrange-
ment of the text reflects the order of actions in the tourist's progress, and 
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the hierarchic organization of text units, signalled by the semantic hierarchy 
of fronted locatives, also reflects the ordering of things in the world. But 
there is yet another reason favouring the structure in place x is y rather 
~ha? y is in place x. Once we are in a certain location, we can expect another 
mdICatlOn of place: place is thus (wIder» information to us than is the 
information about the sight. And as most information in a normal text 
is new, it follows that the description of the sight tends to get longer and 
more weighty t~an the mention of the location. In the structure in place 
x IS y, the «y» IS usually longer than the fronted locative adverbial (<in 
place x». Thus the Principle of End Weight, or Gesetz der wachsenden 
Glieder to speak with Otto Behaghel, conspires with the iconicity. The 
strategy is determined by a conspiracy between iconicity, text disposition 
and information structures within the sentence: all motivate fronting of 
the locative adverbial. 
Different text types make use of different strategies. In texts describing 
the w?rld o~ ~ctions in the world, iconicity is an important principle. In 
ch~o~lcle~ h.stmg events one after the other, the dominant text-strategic 
prmclple IS hkely to be temporal: there is temporal isomorphy between text 
and events. In narrative texts the strategy must usually emphasize not only 
:el1';porality bu: actor as ,;ell. The simplest iconic arrangement of temporal-
Ity IS once agam to speCify actions in the same order as they took place, 
but.as narr~tologists have shown (see for instance GENETTE 1972), many 
devices for mtroducing unities other than temporal iconicity are available 
to a skilled narrator. In argumentative texts, the organizing principle must 
be based on argument patterns: assertion, support, counterassertion, judg-
ment, summary, and the like. We might note in passing that argumentative 
and expository texts may show greater cross-cultural variation than does 
say, a tourist handbook. If the actions are independent of language and 
c~lture, like the tourist's go-look-learn sequence, we can expect texts in 
different languages and from different cultures to have much the same ma-
crostruture. But if the actions are more dependent on cultural tradition 
we might also expect texts to be culture-dependent. This is true for instanc~ 
of school essays, editorials, and medical articles (see e.g. CONNOR and 
KAPLAN 1987, TIRKKONEN-CONDIT 1987, LIEFTLANDER-KOISTINEN forth-
coming, and REGENT 1985). 
7 
I have now introduced two new problem areas into my talk. I have spoken 
about text types and about the text strategies that are associated with them. 
Both need a word of comment. 
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First, text strategies. In linguistics many people have spoken about strate-
gies, but far fewer have tried to define what they mean by a strategy. Let 
me begin by noting that «strategy» in fact is a process term rather than 
a structure term. Those who speak about strategies are obviously interested 
in viewing text production and text comprehension as processes, because 
a basic component in the meaning of «strategy» is management and move-
ment and disposition. In a military context, to cite the Concise Oxford, 
a strategy involves «management of an army or armies in a campaign, art 
of so moving or disposing troops or ships or aircraft as to impose upon 
the enemy the place & time & conditions for fighting preferred by oneself». 
Tactics is the term for the procedures adopted in actual contact with the 
enemy. Analogically I have spoken about text strategies in the sense of 
management of discourse as a whole and above the sentence. Text strategies 
are then executed by «tactics», that is, by choices of words and syntactic 
structures. The overall flow of information through the text and the 
management of old and new information, theme and rheme, topic and 
comment are thus matters of text strategy. The actual ways in which old 
and new information are expressed by lexis and syntax are matters of 
syntax, of text tactics as one might say with an analogy from the military. 
\( is easy enough to talk about strategies in such general terms, metaphor-
ically as it were. \( is far more difficult to specify precisely what a text 
strategy might be. As «strategy» is a process term related to decision proce-
dures, we can only approach it through a conceptual frame borrowed from 
decision theory. Therefore a brief rehearsal of a few fundamental concepts 
of decision theory is in order. 
Decisions are made in a decision space, whose dimensions are determined 
by the factors affecting the decision and of the world within which the 
decision takes place. The forces affecting decisions can be modelled as 
parameters having specific ranges of values and, in each text and text type, 
a characteristic weight. The patterning of parameter values and weights 
in turn determine the category to which the phenomenon described 
through the parameter belongs. Thus for instance in the tourist guide the 
iconicity parameter has a positive value: iconicity is important. But iconic-
ity actually interferes with another principle, that of English canonical 
word order which generally favours beginning sentences with a subject noun 
phrase. In a tourist guide, iconicity is more important than canonical word 
order: the iconicity parameter is weighted more heavily than the canonical-
word-order parameter, with the result that canonical word order has to yield 
to iconicity. Text strategies can thus be modelled as arising from an inter-
play of parameters which have a value and a weight. Often parameters con-
spire towards the same result; but often they conflict. In case of conflicts, 
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the stronger parameter, the one weighted more heavily. always wins. A text 
is thus like a battlefield after the battle: we see the winning forces, and 
those that lost have left the battleground. So-called poetic licence, which 
arises when a poet fails to harmonize poetic form with ordinary syntax, 
is another good case in point. If the metre is faulty, syntax has won; and 
if the syntax is warped in the interests of metre and rhyme, the metre 
parameter has been given a weight greater than the syntax parameter. If 
so, metre has won and syntax has lost the battle. 
To model the ways in which text production is steered by a text strategy 
we must place text strategies in a frame. Students of text and discourse 
have operated with various text models, which can be conveniently grouped 
under four main headings as long as we admit combinations and overlaps 
of our four model types. The first model type I have called sentence-based 
because it accepts texts as they are, without tampering with their sentence 
division, and traces links between sentences in terms of repetition, 
anaphora, cataphora, substitution, ellipsis, synonymy, hyponymy, infer-
ence, and the like. Sentence-based models can be characterized as static, 
the remaining three as dynamic. The second mode1 I have called predi-
cation-based because it starts out from a set of predications which are textu-
alized into discourse. The third model is cognitive: it goes further back 
than the predication-based model in trying to form predications out of 
a knowledge store, such as a cognitive network, sets of frames and schemata 
and scripts. And the fourth model type is interactional in that it looks into 
the interactional reasons why a certain person in a certain situation chooses 
to extract certain predications out of his knowledge store for textualization, 
and why he chooses certain politeness levels, turn-taking signals and the 
like for his discourse. Interactional text models thus lean heavily on prag-
matics. 
Of these four model types, strategies enter conspicuously into the dy-
namic ones, the predication-based and cognitive and interactional. A sim-
ple box diagram illustrating the basic principles of a predication-based 
model might look like this: 
'---___ t_e_xt_u_al_iz_er ___ ---.J~~ text 
The predications are simple propositions, at this level prelexical. The text 
strategy governs their linearization, conjunction and embedding, and the 
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textualizer then turns them into text by dressing them in words and syntactic 
structures. To implement such a model of course requires specification of 
what the set of predications looks like and how the strategy operates on 
it: some attempts at such specification have been made (cf. the <<lext base» 
of VAN DUK and KINTSCH 1983 and of 'fuRNER 1987; cf. also the «kernel 
sentenceS» in CHOMSKY 1957 and their use in stylistic analysis in OHMANN 
1964). Still I am proposing this diagram as a rough scheme only, without 
claiming to be able to operationalize it in terms that could be handled by 
man or by computer. 
In this sense, then, a text strategy is a set of principles governing the 
textualization of a set of predications. If the principles adopted arise 
through conflicts and conspiracies between various text-shaping forces 
which can be modelled in terms of parameter weighting, we can try an 
operationally more concrete definition: a text strategy is a goal-determined 
weighting pattern of decision parameters. The term «goal-determined» 
brings in the text-producer's purpose and opens a channel for introducing 
interactional considerations into predication-based text modelling. In this 
sense, «text strategy» becomes a near-synonym of «style». Conversely, an 
interpretation strategy would be a goal-determined procedure for the re-
covery of aspects of the text strategy and text world out of an existing text. 
There are other ways of looking at text strategies which are compatible 
with the definition I gave a moment ago. In terms of information theory, 
we can say that the purpose of all communication is to increase the pool 
of shared information between text producer and receptor. The theory also 
tells us that information is increased through the elimination of alterna-
tives: every time a text producer chooses one item from a paradigmatic 
set of alternatives within a system, he has eliminated the other alternatives 
and thus specified a piece of information. In this light we might define 
text strategy as an ordered pattern of the elimination of alternatives, for 
instance in terms of the linear order in which a text is supposed to increase 
the shared pool of information. 
These were process-based definitions. But unfortunately the processes 
postulated by such definitions are hard or impossible to get at, except 
through the product, the text, they have produced. True, we can to some 
extent simulate text processing by computer, as in work with artificial intel-
ligence, and try, if we dare, to set up analogies between the operations of 
the computer and of the human mind. And we can try our hand at psy-
cholinguistic expermentation hoping to gain insight into actual human dis-
course processing. Still in today's state of the linguistic art we must live 
with a gap between a product-based, discourse-based, reconstruction of 
hypothetical processes, and the actual processes of the mind: we have no 
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grammar based on the anatomy and physiology of the brain. Therefore 
we must still short -cut our hypothesizing of discourse processing and relate 
strategies, not to neurology but to discourse structure. We might for in-
stance say that the strategy of the tourist guide, the go-look-learn strategy, 
is reflected in frequent sentences with locative topicalization and post-
verbal subjects, either with heavy post-modification or with anaphorically 
signalled specification in the following sentence or sentences. Such a relat-
ing of text strategies directly to text structure will inevitably turn the student 
of text strategies into a student of discourse structures, of text types and 
indeed of styles. One may therefore well ask whether the term «text 
strategy» is motivated at all, or whether it ought to be shaved off by 
OCCAM'S razor. Without being a «realist», as opposed to a «nominalist» 
in the scholastic sense, I still see some virtues in talking about text strategies. 
Such a term reminds us of language as a dynamic process and relates text 
production to a sequence of complicated choices, some hierarchic and 
some heterarchic, within many interrelated systems. These interrelated sys-
tems in turn constitute language. 
8 
With the structural approach to text strategies as appearing in the product 
and not only in the process, we have in fact entered text typology, which 
to literary scholars means, among other things, the study of literary genres. 
Text typology is an important area of intertextuality: it is the intertextual 
comparison and grouping of texts into categories, into genres, that yields 
typologies. And it provides us with many of the structural systems out of 
which text-producers choose one item and reject its paradigmatic rivals, 
and thus produce meanings. About genres I presumably need say no more: 
I hope the link between the lingUist's typologies and the literary scholar's 
genres, Gattungen, is obvious enough. In this light I should define a literary 
genre as a text type sanctioned by a literary tradition. The first work of 
a new type does not yet belong to a genre, unless we allow a specific genre 
to all works that flout traditions. In a more common sense, a genre has 
arisen when a text type begins spreading beyond a single text. 
9 
Of the now countless corollaries of Murphy's Law, Muir's law has become 
a particular favourite with my students. «When we try to pick out anything 
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by itself,» says Muir's Law «we find it hitched to everything else in the 
universe» (BLOCK 1981). Those of you who have borne with me this morn-
ing can see why. Text structures are related to genres and to text types, which 
are results of text strategies, which are in turn motivated by a text producer's 
efforts to help his fellow men to share a text world and a universe of dis-
course. And conversely: a speaker's or writer's desire to share his world 
with others is reflected in discourse structures which are exponents of text 
strategies. So, to understand why tourist guides have many sentences begin-
ning with adverbials of place we must know a great deal about human 
society and human behaviour, induding language processing. 
Such global views are likely to worry linguists more than they daunt liter-
ary scholars. Students of literature are used to looking at texts as exponents 
of personalities operating in a social setting and as stimuli towards world-
building in a receptor. Some linguists on the contrary emphasize that lin-
guistics has so far achieved its best results when eliminating as many uncon-
trollable variables as possible from their consideration. Such a restrictionist 
policy underlies for instance the principle that linguistics should look into 
the behaviour of ideal speakers in a homogeneous speech society, though 
we well know that such speakers and societies do not exist. The opposite, 
expansionist mood has been spreading triumphantly among linguists in 
the past few decades. There are many linguists who study linguistic varia-
tion, emphasizing that variation rather than homogeneity is an essential 
feature of all speech societies. There are many linguists who look into hesi-
tation, correction and repair, not as deviations of an ideal state of perfec-
tion but as natural mechanisms that every linguistic system must tolerate 
and even develop in the interests of communication. An interesting area 
ofresearch would be what one might call syntactic tolerance: which syntac-
tic structures can be tolerated, under different circumstances, without des-
troying the message? The tolerance border obviously runs short of mis-
representation: we cannot say Charlie hit Jack if what we mean is Jack 
hit Charlie. Further, there are pragmalinguists who look at linguistic struc-
tures against the background, not of syntax but of human behaviour pat-
terns: speech acts, politeness, turn-taking, and the like. 
There has, then, been a new marriage between Mercury and Philology, 
one whose nuptial gifts are once again all the arts that go into the study 
of language. In linguistics and in the study of literature we need more col-
laboration than ever, and it seems to me that recent discourse linguistics 
should have something to give to students of literature, just as students 
of literature can enrich discourse linguistics with many relevant observa-
tions. In work on cognitive science and artificial intelligence, needless 
borders between departments tend to disappear by themselves as it were. 
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In universities, departmental divisions, needless hierarchization (is linguis-
tics part of a literature-oriented philology, or is the study of literature a 
subdepartment of linguistics?). and personal ignorance and prejudice have 
often hindered a natural collaboration and even fusion of linguistics and 
Literaturwissenschaft. I think we could use a new Martianus Capella to 
provide a happy frame in which these disciplines could enter into a fecund 
union. 
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